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The relations between Turkey and the European
Union are special for several reasons. Of all can-
didates, Turkey has been aspiring to EU mem-
bership for the longest time. With 70 million ci-
tizens, it is the most populous candidate coun-
try1, and if it were admitted to the EU, around
the year 2020 would become the single most po-
pulous Member State2. It would also be the only
UE Member State inhabited almost exclusively
by Muslims. Like Cyprus, it lies almost entirely
in the Asian continent3. Because of the scale of
TurkeyÕs internal problems, the country faces
much more serious reservations concerning its
accession than the remaining candidates. Tur-
keyÕs membership application meets with the
strongest opposition in the European Union4.
This paper aims to discuss the history of the
complex relations between Turkey and the Euro-
pean Union, the main issues that impede Tur-
keyÕs integration with the Community, including
the countryÕs internal problems in particular,
and the transformations taking place in Turkey
under the influence of Community policy.
Key points
1. Integration with the European Union offers
Turkey a good opportunity to consolidate its de-
mocratic political system and modernise the co-
untry. As Turkey adapts to European standards,
it will have to gradually dismantle the system
founded on the special position of the army as
the guarantor of internal stability and predicta-
bility of AnkaraÕs foreign policy, which has been
in place for over 80 years. A new political system
will have to be created in its place.
2. The EEC/EU policy towards Turkey is the resul-
tant of two forces. On the one hand, there is the
awareness of TurkeyÕs strategic importance and
the need to avoid pushing it away from Europe
On the other, there is knowledge of the scale of
problems faced by Turkey, fear that adaptation
to European standards might trigger the coun-
tryÕs destabilisation, concern about the consequ-
ences of TurkeyÕs integration for the Union it-
self, and finally, a sense of the countryÕs cultural
and religious dissimilarity. Consequently, the qu-
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estion of whether Turkey should join the Union
has yet to be answered.
3. With more realistic membership prospects
after Turkey became a candidate country in
1999, and with the moderately favourable inter-
nal situation, Turkey decided to initiate serious
pro-European reforms. These two factors have
also demonstrated that the EU is capable of in-
fluencing the internal situation in Turkey to
a much greater extent. Complete implementa-
tion of the reforms will take a few years and the-
ir success will largely depend on increased invo-
lvement of the EU in the process of TurkeyÕs in-
tegration. 
I. Historical relations between
Turkey and the West vs. 
the integration process 
AnkaraÕs membership aspirations are an exten-
sion of more than a century of TurkeyÕs endeavo-
urs to gain recognition as a European country.
The EU-Turkish relations must be seen in the
context of the several hundred years of the Otto-
man EmpireÕs relations with the West, or in the
even broader context of relations between the
West and the Islamic world. 
The Turks have been present in Europe for 650
years. This was one of the manifestations of the
political and cultural ties between the Balkans
and western Anatolia, which have a history of
2500 years5. Among all Muslim countries, the Ot-
toman Empire maintained the strongest econo-
mic, political and cultural ties with Christian Eu-
rope6. However, due to the religious difference
and the absolutist state tradition, it was never
fully recognised by the Christian, more ÒcivilÓ
Europe7. In the eyes of most Europeans, the Em-
pire was an oriental, Asian despoty, the antithe-
sis of Europeanness8. The expansion of the Otto-
man Empire in Europe was one of the factors
that contributed to the formation of a shared Eu-
ropean identity9. Even today, the religion issue is
of special importance in the relations between
Turkey and the EU. Turkey is the only candidate
country to inspire declarations on the part of Eu-
ropean politicians denying it the right to inte-
gration on the ground of cultural dissimilarity,
irrespective of how well Turkey meets the mem-
bership criteria. As a result, a large number of
Turks view the EU as a ÒChristian clubÓ, are rela-
tively highly distrustful of the EU and sceptical
about TurkeyÕs accession, even though they sup-
port integration10. In Turkey, the sense of dissi-
milarity leads to concerns about whether natio-
nal identity can be preserved in a united Europe.
These concerns are more intense than in the
other candidate countries11.
After defeats in the European battlefields and
the loss of some territories in Europe, the Otto-
man Empire became the first Muslim country to
embrace certain elements of Western culture. In
the 19 th century, this process was named Tanzi-
mat. Because of the tradition of authoritaria-
nism, the adaptation of western democratic in-
stitutions to Turkish conditions proved to be the
most difficult part. The reforms intended to
bring Turkey closer to the West acquired a new
quality after the First World War. General Kemal
Ataturk created a secular republic in which the
modern Turkish national identity crystallised.
Owing to this transformation, several decades
later Turkey could introduce a democratic sys-
tem, and subsequently, a free market economy.
The process of implementing European models
altered different regions of Turkey in varying de-
grees. There is a clear difference in the extent to
which modern values were embraced in the we-
stern part of the country and the southern coast
on the one hand, and the remaining parts, espe-
cially the south-east, which remains closely con-
nected with the Near East in cultural terms even
today, on the other12. Consequently, Turkey is fre-
quently referred to as the country at the crossro-
ads, struggling to define its own attitude to-
wards its Europeanness13.
The most important factor that got the West in-
terested in integrating Turkey into the European
system of powers was its geostrategic location
in the midst of ÒinflammableÓ regions such as
the Caucasus, the Near East and the Balkans,
and the fact that Turkey controlled the Straits.
Th This factor was especially important during
the Cold War. It was then that Turkey became
a strategic ally of the United States. In 1952, Tur-
key joined NATO. Washington has been the most
important advocate of TurkeyÕs integration with
the EU ever since14. From the point of view of
Brussels, TurkeyÕs location became even more
C E S  S t u d i e s
important when Greece joined the EEC in 1981,
since for many years, relations between Athens
and Ankara had been full of tension, mainly over
Cyprus15. After the collapse of communism, Tur-
keyÕs geostrategic location lost some of its for-
mer importance. Its role in the EUÐTurkey rela-
tions increased again in the aftermath of the
ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus,
the wars in Iraq (1991, 2003), the emergence of
independent states in Central Asia and the Cau-
casus, the Ògreat gameÓ over the pipeline routes
from Central Asia and Azerbaijan, the war aga-
inst Islamic terrorism initiated after 11 Septem-
ber 2001, the projected enlargement of the EU
into the Balkans, and the European UnionÕs in-
creasing commitments beyond Europe, inclu-
ding in the Near East. According to advocates of
TurkeyÕs integration with the EU, the coun-
tryÕs geostrategic situation is the chief argu-
ment in favour of its accession. They believe that
given TurkeyÕs geographic location, combined
with the secularity of state and a relatively de-
mocratic political system, the country is prede-
stined to act as a bridge between the West and
the Islamic world, and as a model for other Mu-
slim societies16.
II. The internal problems 
of Turkey vs. the process of its
integration with the European
Union 
Turkey has to deal with numerous internal pro-
blems that impede its adaptation to European
standards. Its most serious problem is the insta-
bility of democracy and the difficulties it has in
developing a state of law. These problems surfa-
ce as authoritarian tendencies, corruption, ne-
potism, clientelism, deep political divisions,
unstable government coalitions1 7, terro r i s m1 8
and torture. 
It was a Turkish paradox that the reforms (Tanzi-
mat, Kemalism) intended to bring the country
closer to the West had to be imposed on the so-
ciety, frequently against its will, using undemo-
cratic methods that involved restricting the so-
cietyÕs independence as a political subject. For
the first 23 years of its existence, the Turkish re-
public created by Ataturk was an authoritarian
regime. The West-oriented reforms were carried
out by the army, which became their most im-
portant guarantor and an arbiter of political life.
Over the last 50 years, the military carried out
four coups dÕetat (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997), secu-
ring the countryÕs internal stability. As a result,
the army became a generally respected state in-
stitution19.
Another problem faced by Turkey is the coun-
tryÕs ethnic diversity, which breeds a strong at-
tachment to integrity and sovereignty and sepa-
ratist tendencies at the same time. 
The former trend stems from the fact that the
Turkish republic was created out of resistance to
the plans to divide the Ottoman Empire among
European countries. This attachment to integri-
ty has led to a negation of the national minori-
tiesÕ existence in Turkey20. Members of the lar-
gest, Kurdish national minority account for ap-
prox. 12Ð15 percent of the population of Turkey.
Nearly half of all Kurds live in Turkey21. More
than half of the Turkish Kurds live in the poorest,
south-eastern part of the country22. The gap be-
tween this part of the country and the more de-
veloped and more densely populated west is de-
epening, in spite of the efforts of the Turkish au-
thorities. For the last 80 years, the Turkish repu-
blic has refused to grant the Kurds even a limi-
ted cultural autonomy. On the most part, it
aimed to assimilate them and referred to them
as the so-called Mountain Turks. This policy was
a decisive factor in the development of separa-
tist aspirations of the Kurds. Since 1984, south-
eastern Turkey has been the scene of a war aga-
inst the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) guerril-
las. The armyÕs operations against the Kurdish
guerrilla fighters have led to large-scale human
rights violations on both sides of the conflict23.
They also entailed restrictions on the freedom of
speech and freedom of assemblies all over the
country. The fight against PKK guerrillas has al-
so been a great burden for TurkeyÕs economy. In
the end, the war against the Kurds became the
main obstacle on TurkeyÕs way to the European
Union. 
Another source of internal tension is the clash
between the rigorous concept of the stateÕs se-
cularity and the efforts of integristic communi-
ties that aim to subject politics to religion. As
a result of secularisation, the Turks came to ac-
cept the separation of state and religion. At the
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same time, though, the Turkish society is more
religious than other European societies2 4. The rise
of religious practice in the 80s and the 90s led to
renewed disputes over the position of religion in
public life2 5. There is a minority of approx. 15Ð20
percent of Turks who reject secularisation. Par-
ties catering to this electorate have been present
in Turkey since the 70s. They aim to establish
a confessional state using political means26 and
oppose the rapprochement between Turkey and
the West. Radical militant Islamic terrorist orga-
nisations also formed in the 70s and enjoy limi -
ted public support today27. The Islamic party
was dissolved four times, and has functioned
under five different names: National Order Party
(MNP), National Salvation Party (MSP), Welfare
Party (Refah), Virtue Party (Fazilet), and Happi-
ness Party (Saadet). The existence of these gro-
ups and their good electoral showings in the
90s28 served as a justification for the armyÕs in-
volvement in politics. In 1997, a military inter-
vention toppled the coalition government cre-
ated by Refah29. The support of Turkish society
for the separation of religion and state and its
approval of the special position of the army fa-
vour the evolution of Turkish Islamists and the
formation of conservative groups that see Islam
as a source of inspiration and identity, but refra-
in from mixing religion and politics. In the 80s,
the Motherland Party (ANAP) of Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal was just such a group. Presently, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan meets this definition even more
fully. TurkeyÕs accession to the EU s at the foun-
dation of the programmes of both these parties.
The AKP was created in 2001 from the moderate
fraction of Fazilet30. The issue of religion has one
more aspect, that of divisions among the Mu-
slims themselves. Approx. 20 percent of the in-
habitants of Turkey are Alevites, a liberal variety
of Islam similar to Shia Islam in theological
terms. There is a history of l enmity between the
Sunnis and the Alevites, which was revived in
the 80s31.
Turkey is the poorest EU candidate country. In
the 2003 UN Human Development Report, Tur-
key occupies the last position among all candi-
date countries32. It should be stressed though,
that there are only slight differences between
Turkey on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Roma-
nia on the other. Besides, Turkey set out to catch
up with the West from a much lower level than
the remaining candidates33.
One of the main reasons why TurkeyÕs civilisatio-
nal development lagged behind was the sta-
teÕs overemphasised position in the economy. By
the early 80s, Turkey had an autarchic economic
system characterised by interventionism, pro-
tectionism and an overgrown state-owned sec-
tor. This was conducive to corruption, cliente-
lism and nepotism, and had an adverse effect on
the development of TurkeyÕs economic relations
with the EU. The inefficiency of the Turkish eco-
nomy led, in the late 70s, to an economic crisis
that necessitated certain liberal reforms. The re-
forms were accompanied by deep social chan-
ges, including urbanisation that entailed the for-
mation of poverty districts (gecekondu) in the
metropolitan suburbs, and the deepening of re-
gional disparities34.
Even though the private sector (small business)
experienced significant growth, and trade and
the movement of capital were liberalised, the
government failed to carry out a large-scale pri-
vatisation that could have broken the pathologic
links between politics and business. The most
serious omission was the failure to reform the
banking system. As a result, in the 80s and 90s,
the Turkish economy was affected by instability
and high inflation35. This caused a high budget
deficit and limited the volume of foreign invest-
ments36 without which the influx of modern
technologies was impossible and so was a serio-
us modernisation of the Turkish economy37. The
failure to carry out necessary reforms brought
on the banking system crashes of November
2000 and February 2001, and the worst econo-
mic crisis in TurkeyÕs modern history. After ma-
ny years of inadequate economic policies, Tur-
keyÕs foreign debt is presently much higher that
that of the remaining EU candidate countries. In
2002, it equalled as much as 68.9 percent of the
GDP. The stateÕs overall debt has increased from
55.6 percent of the GDP in 1997 to 101.4 percent
in 2001. In this situation, Turkey had to imple-
ment the restrictive economic reform program-
me developed by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)38.
Accession to the European Union is viewed in
Turkey as the most important opportunity to so-
lve the countryÕs internal problems. A great ma-
jority of Turks (approx. 70Ð75 percent) continue
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to support integration3 9. Among all candidate co-
u n t r i e s , Turkey has the highest hopes for positi-
ve change in connection with EU membership40.
Improvement of living standards and the oppor-
tunity to migrate for jobs are of crucial impor-
tance to the Turks. The Kurds, on the other hand,
hope for a broader autonomy once Turkey joins
the EU4 1. Finally, moderate Islamists expect more
autonomy for religion in public life. 
As far as the attitude towards the EU is concer-
ned, the Turks have a particular attachment to
state sovereignty42. Some members of the the-
oretically pro-European elite and society want
integration on TurkeyÕs terms, i.e. without any
serious reforms affecting sovereignty (the Kur-
dish autonomy issue, the armyÕs position). Since
TurkeyÕs membership aspirations enjoy wide
support, nearly all political parties support inte-
gration in their declarations. In reality, though,
three parties may be considered eurosceptical,
including the National Movement Party (MHP) in
the extreme right, the populist Youth Party (GP)
and the fundamentalist Happiness Party (SP). 
Advocates of TurkeyÕs integration argue that if
the country remains outside the EU structures,
this may have an adverse impact on its internal
situation. They believe that it would be in the
UnionÕs best interest to make greater commit-
ments to the process of Tu r ke yÕ s integration, first-
ly, because of the geostrategic reasons discussed
above, and secondly, because Turkey has to cope
with more serious internal problems. Opponents
of TurkeyÕs integration, on the other hand, invo-
ke the countryÕs internal problems as an argu-
ment in support of their claims. They believe
that because of the scale of these problems and
the size of the country, the EU will not be able to
cope with the difficulties. The EU is also concer-
ned about the consequences of TurkeyÕs acces-
sion for the Union itself. The main worries inclu-
de the impact of TurkeyÕs membership on the
further internal integration of the E U4 3, job mi-
gration and the integration of Turks into EU socie-
t i e s4 4, the financing of Tu r ke yÕ s i n t e g r a t i o n4 5, and
the transformation of Tu r ke yÕ s b o rders with Iran,
Syria, Iraq, Georgia and Armenia into the Commu-
n i t yÕ s external bord e r4 6.
III. Relations between Tu r k e y
and the EU in 1959Ð1999 
Turkey applied for association with the Europe-
an Economic Community (EEC) on 31 August
195947. The application was accepted under ar-
ticle 238 of the Treaty of Rome, which provided
that the EEC could establish an association with
any European country. By agreeing to open asso-
ciation negotiations, the EEC recognised Turkey
as aEuropean country. The negotiations were in-
terrupted by the coup dÕetat of 1960. They were
reopened in 1962, but stumbled on the resistan-
ce of some of the Turkish government elite that
opposed any limitation of state sovereignty.
The association agreement was signed 12 Septem-
ber 1963 in Ankara. In the course of negotiations,
the Turkish side strove in vain to include a p ro v i-
sion on the date of Tu r ke yÕ s accession to the EEC
once it complies with the criteria, into the agre-
ement. The Community declined, and a r a t h e r
unspecific provision on this subject was put in the
final agre e m e n t4 8. The two fundamental assump-
tions of the agreement were the gradual forma-
tion of a customs union and the aligning of the
Turkish economic policy with the policies of the
remaining signatories. The agreement pro v i d e d
for an adaptation period of at least 22 years,
which was to be divided into three stages: pre p a-
rations (5Ð9 years), transition (12 years) and the
closing stage4 9. The process was to be superv i s e d
by a specially appointed Association Council.
Because of the difficulties with implementing
the provisions of the Association Agreement, an
additional protocol on the opening of the second
stage of association between Turkey and the EEC
was signed in November 1970. It extended the
second stage from 12 to 22 years. The effective
date of the additional protocol was 1 January
197350. One of its crucial provisions was the one
that that provided for the implementation of the
European agricultural policy in the closing sta-
ge, and for the subsequent extension of the
agreement to include agricultural products. For
the first three years the protocol was implemen-
ted in accordance with the schedule51. In 1976,
however, delays and problems began52. In 1977
and 1978, Turkey invoked article 60 of the addi-
tional protocol, which provided for a general gu-
arantee of the security of the countryÕs interests,
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to postpone the projected reduction of tariffs,
and requested a new agreement under which
Turkish agricultural products and textiles could
be exported to the EEC on more favourable
terms and Turkey could receive increased finan-
cial assistance from the Community. At that ti-
me, Turkey was in a deep economic crisis and
was struggling with terrorism on the extreme ri-
ght and left. For these reasons, in July 1980 the
EEC decided to offer assistance. A new protocol
on association was signed, which provided for
a gradual reduction of customs on Turkish agri-
cultural products, moderate access to the EU la-
bour market for Turkish workers, and 600 mil-
lion ECU of financial assistance. Turkey announ-
ced for the first time in history that it intended
to apply for full membership in autumn that sa-
me year. The new agreement was never imple-
mented, though, and TurkeyÕs membership ap-
plication was not filed because of the military
coup dÕetat of September 1980. 
Tu r ke yÕ s economic integration with the EEC fro m
1963 to 1980 was hardly successful. The
E E CÕ s s h a re in Tu r ke yÕ s imports increased consi-
derably (1963 Ð 29 percent, 1971 Ð 42 perc e n t ) ,
and this was not matched by a similar increase of
the EECÕ s s h a re in Tu r ke yÕ s exports. On the con-
t r a ry, a deep trade deficit was reported. The main
reason for this failure was the huge gap between
the EEC and Tu r ke y, much greater than today5 3.
Besides, Tu r ke yÕ s economic policy at that time
was dominated by interventionist and pro t e c t i o-
nist concepts. The Turkish governmentÕs attitude
towards the EEC was rather exacting. Turkey ho-
ped that association would stimulate a more ra-
pid growth of the economy with EEC subsidies.
Ankara demanded that the EEC open its markets
unilaterally, while continuing to protect the Tur-
kish market. TurkeyÕs stance was motivated by
the economic difficulties in which the country
found itself in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. But
the EEC also had to cope with growing unem-
ployment and economic problems, and was not
interested in opening its markets to cheap pro-
ducts and labour from Turkey.
In reaction to the human rights violations by the
m i l i t a ry regime, the Commission suspended the
implementation of the 1980 protocol and with-
held financial assistance for Tu r ke y. In January
1982, Brussels suspended association. The
E E CÕ s p re s s u re proved successful Ð the junta agre-
ed to hold partly free elections in 1983. As a re-
sult, the moderate opposition led by Tu rgut Ozal
rose to power. The EEC and Tu r key reinstated mu-
tual relations in September 1986. On 14 April
1987 Tu r key officially applied for accession to the
E u ropean Union. Still the same year, free elections
w e re held. To re w a rd Tu r ke y, the EEC re i n s t a t e d
association in September 1988. In order to co-
nvince the EEC that Tu r key deserved to become
a candidate country, OzalÕs government allowed
its citizens to file complaints against the state
with the Strasbourg Court in January 1987. Af t e r
Tu r ke yÕ s application had been filed, the parlia-
ment ratified the UN and European conventions
against torture and inhuman treatment, and li-
fted the prohibition for Turkish politicians active
in the 70s to participate in political life. The crimi-
nal code was also amended5 4.
Turkey applied for accession in the context of
the economic changes taking place in the coun-
try, which created favourable conditions for clo-
ser economic co-operation between Turkey and
the EEC. Shortly after the coup, the military regi-
me initiated historical reforms to liberalise the
Turkish economy, which Ozal continued. The
most important aspect of these reforms was the
opening of TurkeyÕs economy. In the 80s, the li-
beralised Turkish economy was becoming incre-
asingly competitive, and the proportion of
exports to the EEC increased. In 1991, it accoun-
ted for 54 percent55 of TurkeyÕs total exports,
while imports from the EEC accounted for 49
percent of all imports. TurkeyÕs deficit in trade
with the EEC did not decrease substantially in
percentage terms, but it was alleviated by a cle-
ar increase in the number of tourists from the
EEC visiting Turkey.
On 18 December 1989 the European Commission
e x p ressed a negative opinion on Tu r ke yÕ s a p p l i-
cation for accession. A new factor that made Tu r-
ke yÕ s relations with the EEC more difficult on the
political level was the admission of Greece in
1981, the latter having been in a serious conflict
with Ankara for many years. The most important
a rguments against accepting Tu r key as a c a n d i-
date country included the Cyprus issue, territo-
rial disputes with an EEC member Ð Greece, hu-
man rights violations and the condition of Tu r-
ke yÕ s e c o n o m y. The key factor was the human ri-
ghts violations issue connected with the war on
the Kurdish PKK guerrillas that had continued
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since 1984 in south-eastern Turkey. However,
Turkey was recognised as a potential candidate,
i.e. a E u ropean country. At the same time, the ap-
plication of Morocco was rejected, because the
c o u n t ry was found to be non-European. Along
with this decision, the EU reinstated financial as-
sistance, and the Commission developed a p l a n
to deepen relations with Tu r ke y, known as the
Matutes Package, which was presented in June
199056. However, the Council of the EEC rejected
the Package because Greece vetoed it.
In 1991 during the Gulf War, Turkey played a ve-
ry important role in the anti-Iraqi coalition. Pre-
sident Ozal hoped that his country would be re-
warded with a ÒyesÓ to its application. This is
why his political group passed the pro-democra-
tic amendments to the criminal code57 and lifted
the notorious law no 2932 of 1983, which prohi-
bited any form of activity in any language other
than Tu r k i s h5 8. Brussels responded with the
Working Programme presented by the European
Commission in January 1992, a continuation of
the Matutes Package. The ProgrammeÕs most im-
portant provision was the conclusion of a cu-
stoms union by 199559.
The applicable agreement was signed in March
1995 during the meeting of the EEC-Turkey Asso-
ciation Council. The European Parliament, howe-
ver, made the ratification of the union conditio-
nal upon Turkey amending the constitution so
as to expand the freedom of associations and
trade unions, amending the anti-terrorist law,
and releasing detained Kurdish party MPs. Tur-
key tried to persuade the EU to ratify the union
by threatening Brussels with the prospects of
growing support for Islamic fundamentalists,
who were reporting the best electoral showing
in history at that time.
The Turkish Parliament finally passed 17 amend-
m e n t s6 0, sufficient to convince the European Pa r-
liament to ratify the customs union. Even Gre e c e
w i t h d rew its veto against the union, in return for
the promise that accession negotiations would be
opened with Cyprus in spite of the absence of
a g reement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
This meant that the EU was losing its chief instru-
ment for pressing Greece, i.e. it could no longer
m a ke the accession of Cyprus conditional upon
a p revious agreement with Turkish Cypriots.
In the end, the customs union between the EU
and Tu r key became effective as of 1 January 1996.
It was to be implemented over the next five
years under the supervision of the specially ap-
pointed Customs Union Joint Committee. The cu-
stoms union not only included manufactured go-
ods and foods, but also provided for the harmo-
nisation of competition regulations and techni-
cal legislation, protection of copyrights and the
elimination of monopolies. The customs union
led to increased trade exchange between the EU
and Turkey in absolute figures, but it failed to re-
duce TurkeyÕs trade deficit in the exchange with
the Community. Over the five years, Turkey fa-
iled to fully implement all provisions of the cu-
stoms union61.
Turkey is the only country to have concluded
a customs union with the EU and not have star-
ted accession negotiations. This means that it
has opened its market to the EU markets to the
same degree as the candidate countries have,
but it is receiving much less financial assistance
from the Community62. Turkey treated the cu-
stoms union above all as a step towards full
membership, while Brussels saw it as a kind of
substitute.
In the period in question, the context of EUÐTur-
key relations changed as the question of the
EUÕs eastward enlargement emerged after the
disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Brussels perce-
ived the membership aspirations of Central and
Eastern European countries differently from Tur-
keyÕs endeavours. This exposed the Communi-
tyÕs attitude towards the European aspirations
of Ankara. The key difference was that in the for-
mer case the assistance and certainty of mem-
bership prevailed over conditions and prerequ-
isites. In the case of Turkey, mutual relations we-
re still about setting conditions, and member-
ship prospects remained uncertain. The human
rights situation in Turkey was not a sufficient ju-
stification for this difference. This is evident if
one looks at the example of Slovakia, whose de-
mocratic system failed to meet the EUÕs political
criteria until 1998. Nevertheless, the Union did
not withhold financial assistance to Slovakia in
the 90s, and accepted its application for acces-
sion in 1997. This difference in the treatment of
Central and Eastern European countries and Tur-
key is also visible if one compares the amounts
of financial assistance granted to each of them
prior to becoming candidate countries. This assi-
stance, it should be remembered, contributed to
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the development of civil society and successful
implementation of reforms in the post-commu-
nist countries. In 1990Ð1996, the EU committed
13.2 billion Euro of assistance to the post-com-
munist countries inhabited by a total of over 100
million people. In 1964Ð1995, Turkey, with a po-
pulation of approx. 60 million, received just over
1 billion Euro of assistance from Brussels. 
During the Luxembourg summit in late 1997, the
EU was going to grant candidate status to appli-
cant countries. Turkey decided to win Brussels
over by passing further amendments to the law
on State Security Courts63 in March 1997. In July
1997, the European Commission issued the
Agenda 2000, a document that set forth its en-
largement strategy. The authors of Agenda 2000
divided the countries applying for accession to
the EU into two groups. Countries from the first
group were to be granted the status of candida-
tes and start accession negotiations shortly after
the summit. Countries from the second group
were also gaining candidate status, but negotia-
tions with them were to be opened in a few
years. Turkey was the only country not to be in-
cluded in any of the groups. Agenda 2000 invo-
ked the so-called Copenhagen criteria as the re-
ason why Tu r ke yÕ s application was rejected. De-
fined during the Copenhagen summit in June
1993, the Copenhagen criteria stated that candi-
date countries had to have stable democratic in-
stitutions and the rule of law, respect human ri-
ghts and ethnic minority rights, have a f u n c t i o-
nal market economy, and be able to take on the
obligations of membership. The most important
p roblems in the case of Tu r key included human
rights violations and legal discrimination against
the Ku rds, restrictions on the freedom of speech
and assemblies, and imperfection of the demo-
cratic system. Tu r key tried to influence the
E U Õ s decision until the last moment. In December
1997, shortly before the Lu xe m b o u rg summit,
the Turkish parliament passed laws intended to
eliminate the use of torture by the police. Yet du-
ring the summit, the EU went by the Commis-
s i o nÕ s recommendation and accepted the applica-
tions of all countries except for Tu r ke y. At the sa-
me time, however, it reaffirmed that joining the
Union in the future was open to Tu r ke y.
The summit was followed by the most impor-
tant crisis of EUÐTurkey relations in history. An-
kara was resentful of the fact that Slovakia was
included in the second group of countries, nego-
tiations with which were to be opened at a later
date. Turkey was also embittered at the state-
ment by Helmut Kohl, the German Chancellor,
i.e. the leader of the UnionÕs most important
member, who said that Turkey was never going
to join the European Union because it was not
a European country in cultural terms. With this,
Kohl questioned more than 40 years of the
EUÕs policy towards Turkey, in which the latter
had always been treated as a potential member.
Ankara partly suspended its relations with the
EU and tried to blackmail the Community by
threatening to block NATO enlargement. In order
to restore relations with Turkey, in June 1998 du-
ring the Cardiff summit the EU decided that
even though Turkey was not a candidate coun-
try, a Regular Report on TurkeyÕs progress to-
wards accession would be prepared, just as in
the case of the candidate countries. Also during
the Cardiff summit, the EU adopted the Europe-
an Strategy for Turkey prepared three months
earlier by the European Commission. The Strategy
p rovided for the implementation of the a c q u i s by
Tu r key and for the extension of the customs
u n i o n to include the services and agriculture sec-
tors. Turkey responded in July 1998 with the do-
cument entitled ÒA strategy for developing rela-
tions between Turkey and the European Union Ð
TurkeyÕs proposalsÓ, which was generally in 
keeping with the line of the EU ÒStrategyÓ. The
decision taken by the Luxembourg summit led to
a rise of anti-Western and nationalistic senti-
ments in Turkey. As a result, the nationalist 
National Movement Party (MHP) showed good
results in the 1999 elections, and had to be inc-
luded in the government coalition. 
By the mid 80s, the question of TurkeyÕs mem-
bership had not been a subject of serious deba-
te because the development disparities betwe-
en the EEC and Turkey were too deep. Brussels
strove to preserve good relations with Turkey
because of the cold war. In 1987, Turkey filed
its application for accession in connection
with the economic transformations taking pla-
ce in the country in the 80s. Serious debate on
TurkeyÕs membership began in the 90s, when
the question of the post-communist countriesÕ
accession emerged. The most important rese-
rvation regarding TurkeyÕs candidacy, i.e. that
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of large scale human rights violations, was ful-
ly justified and borne out by reports of interna-
tional and Turkish human rights organisations.
The relations between Brussels and the post-
communist countries showed that the EU was
pursuing a different policy towards Ankara,
committing much less to the supporting of de-
mocratic transformations in Tu r key than it did
in the other candidate countries. In order to co-
nvince the EU that it deserved the status of
a candidate country, Tu r key passed some pro-
European amendments to its legislation in or-
der to improve the human rights situation. The-
ir practical effect was limited, though, because
of the ongoing war against the PKK.
I V. The relations between Tu r k e y
and the EU in 1999Ð2004
In 1999, the European Commission issued the
second Regular Report, in which it recommen-
ded that Turkey should be granted the status of
a candidate country. Thus, Brussels voiced the
conviction that the original customs union had
exhausted its potential. Even though the situ-
ation in Turkey had not changed substantially
since 1997 Ð the Turkish parliament customarily
passed some pro-democratic amendments64 Ð on
10 December 1999 during the Helsinki Summit
AnkaraÕs application for accession was accepted.
The key factors that influenced this decision inc-
luded the victory of the social democrats in the
1998 elections in Germany and, to a smaller
extent, the improvement in the relations betwe-
en Turkey and Greece65.
In April 2000, after a three-year break, the Tur-
keyÐEU Association Council met again and deci-
ded to appoint eight subcommittees to deal with
the harmonisation of the Turkish law with the
Community acquis. In August and September
2000, Turkey adopted four important internatio-
nal conventions, which theoretically expanded
the freedoms of Turkish citizens66. In November
2000, the Commission prepared the Accession
Partnership for Turkey. The EU adopted it in De-
cember 2000 during the Nice summit. Accession
Partnership included a detailed specification of
short and medium term legislative reforms that
Turkey was supposed to implement to meet the
Copenhagen criteria. These reforms related to
the freedom of speech, assembly and associa-
tion, lifting of the ban on teaching and media
content in languages other than Turkish, elimi-
nation of torture, increased civilian control over
the army, improved operation and greater inde-
pendence of the administration of justice, elimi-
nation of capital punishment, and settlement of
the Cyprus issue. In the economic and admini-
strative dimension, Accession Partnership provi-
ded for legislative amendments adjusting the
Turkish law to the acquis to be implemented in
the short and medium term. The Turkish govern-
ment responded by publishing, in March 2001,
the National Programme that largely complied
with the recommendations of the EU initiative67.
In December 2000, shortly before the summit,
the EU reinstated financial assistance for Turkey,
and the funds were paid out within the subsequ-
ent two years. However, during the Nice summit
the EU excluded Turkey Ð as the only candidate
country Ð from discussions on the division of vo-
tes following the institutional reform. The fact
that Turkey had not opened accession negotia-
tions was quoted as a justification of this deci-
sion. This meant that the EU had yet to be fully
convinced that Turkey should become a member.
The volume of financial assistance provided to
Turkey further proved this Ð even though the
amount of assistance had increased, it was still
much lower than the amounts of funds provided
to the other candidates prior to opening nego-
tiations with them68.
In October 2001, the Turkish parliament began
the implementation of the National Programme.
It amended the constitution so as to expand the
freedom of speech69, allow the use of languages
other than Turkish in the press, limit the possi-
bility of the dissolution of political parties70 and
strengthen civilian influence in the National Se-
curity Council71. It also abolished the death pe-
nalty for ordinary crimes, but not for acts of ter-
rorism. On 27 November 2001, the Turkish par-
liament amended the civil code making the posi-
tion of women completely equal to that of men7 2.
In December 2001, the Laeken summit mitigated
the Nice provisions and allowed Turkey to parti-
cipate on the same rights as the other candida-
tes in the European Convention working on the
UnionÕs constitution. For the first time in histo-
ry, the Fifteen also adopted a single framework
document that specified the terms on which Tur-
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key was to receive financial assistance. In Febru-
ary 2002, the Turkish parliament passed the first
harmonisation package referred to as the ÒMini
Democratic PackageÓ. The package reduced the
imprisonment penalties for activities undermi-
ning the state and nationÕs integrity73, and the
detention duration prescribed in the law on Sta-
te Security Courts74.
In March 2002, the parliament passed the se-
cond harmonisation package, which amended: 
1. the law on political parties, by restraining the
possibilities of dissolution formerly provided for
by the constitution, 
2. the law on associations75,
3. the press law76,
4. the law on State Security Courts77,
5. the law on assemblies78.
In June 2002, during the Seville summit, the EU
announced that it was going to take new deci-
sions on the status of Turkish-EU relations du-
ring the December summit in Copenhagen. In Ju-
ly 2002, the Turkish parliament lifted the state
of emergency in two of the four provinces in so-
uth-eastern Turkey, and in November Ð in the re-
maining two.
The third reform package was passed in August
2002. In the case of the law on associations, it
slowed down the reform process to a certain de-
gree79. The parliament abolished the death pe-
nalty for all crimes except those committed du-
ring war or under an imminent threat of war. It
also amended the radio and television law, lega-
lising the use of languages other than Turkish,
and the law on education, allowing instruction
in languages other than Turkish. Other amend-
ments further expanded the freedom of speech80
and granted Turkish citizens the right of appeal
against court sentences found to be in breach of
human rights by the European Court. This, howe-
v e r, applied solely to court rulings issued after
the amendment was passed. 
On 3 November 2002, the moderate Islamic Ju-
stice and Development Party (AKP) won the hi-
storical parliamentary elections, garnering near-
ly 1/3 of all votes. Owing to the unusually high
electoral threshold of 10 percent and the general
loss of confidence in the existing political elite,
the AKP won nearly 2/3 of seats in parliament.
Within just one year, the AKP government pro-
ved itself to be the most pro-EU government in
the history of Turkey. It introduced a brand new,
conciliatory style into TurkeyÕs policy towards
the EU. Shortly after the elections, the govern-
ment embarked on a great diplomatic offensive
in the EU capitals, striving to convince the EU le-
aders to set the start date for negotiations du-
ring the Copenhagen summit. However, during
the summit that took place on 12Ð13 December
2002, the EU decided that Turkey was not yet re-
ady to start the negotiations, pledging, however,
to reconsider TurkeyÕs candidacy towards the
end of 2004. A shift in the EUÕs approach was al-
so visible in the fact that Turkey was included in
several Community programmes, and the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Commis-
sion agreed to increase the assistance provided
to Turkey to 1.05 billion Euro in 2004Ð2006 Ð
though this was still less than what the Central
and Eastern European countries received in
1990Ð199381. The statements made by European
leaders following the Copenhagen summit sho-
wed that TurkeyÕs integration was still a source
of serious concern. Apart from the extreme right
and populist formations, such concern was spelt
by Valery Giscard dÕEstaign, the former French
leader and President of the European Conven-
tion, and by the German Christian democrat op-
position. Giscard dÕEstaign said that if Turkey jo-
ined the European Union, the latter would cease
to exist. He suggested deepening the special re-
lations with Turkey instead.
In the wake of the Copenhagen summit, the AKP
accelerated reforms. In December 2002, the par-
liament passed the fourth reform package,
expanding the liberties of religious minority fo-
undations82 and introducing legislation conduci-
ve to the elimination of torture83. Journalists 
were granted the right to journalistic secrecy.
Parliament also amended the law on political
parties, making dissolution possible only if 60
percent of MPs vote for.
Practical implementation of the reforms passed
by parliament stumbled on the resistance of so-
me members of the military-bureaucratic esta-
blishment, especially over issues concerning na-
tional minority rights. In December 2002, the
Radio and Television Council restricted broadca-
sts in languages other than Turkish exclusively
to the public media and to tight time limits. Si-
multaneously, the amendment to the law on the
teaching of languages other than Turkish beca-
me effective. The regulation passed under pres-
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sure from the National Security Council imposed
substantial additional limitations84. In January
2003, parliament passed the fifth reform packa-
ge, giving the right to repeated trial to persons
whose appeals were granted by the Strasbourg
Court prior to the passing of this amendment. In
April 2003, parliament appointed a special har-
monisation commission whose task was to super-
vise the legislative activities pertaining to Euro-
pean integration. Finally, in June 2003, parliament
passed the sixth reform package, amending: 
1. the criminal code (more liberal penalties on
radio and television stations, and limited possi-
bility of closing them down), 
2. the anti-terrorist law85,
3. the law on the Supervisory Council, a body
examining the legality of musical and audio-vi-
sual works86,
4. the law on State Security Courts87,
5. the law on given names88.
Private radio and television stations were also
allowed to broadcast in languages other than
Turkish. Some of the anti-terrorist law amend-
ments were vetoed by president Ahmet Sezer,
former head of the Constitution Court, as thre-
atening the countryÕs integrity. The parliament,
however, overruled the presidential veto.
Towards the end of July 2003, the seventh reform
package was passed. Its most important effect
was to substantially reduce the competencies of
the National Security Council89. Parliament also
passed amendments to the law on the teaching
of languages other than Turkish90, to the law on
associations91, and to the criminal code provi-
sions on the elimination of torture9 2 and pro- t e r-
rorist activities9 3. It amended article 7 of the anti-
- t e r rorist law by redefining terrorist pro p a g a n d a
as direct Òinciting of violenceÓ exclusively, as
well as the law on military courts94 and the law
on assemblies95. Other amendments limited the
use of moral censorship96. In early November
2003, the government drafted its ÒhistoricalÓ
plan for the deep decentralisation of the state. In
March 2004, private schools offering courses in
Kurdish were established for the first time in
Turkish history. Also, the public radio and televi-
sion are about to start broadcasts in Kurdish.
The AKP faced the most severe difficulties while
trying to solve the Cyprus problem. In December
2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed
a plan to unite the island prior to CyprusÕ acces-
sion to the EU. The plan was for the Greek and
the Turkish republics to be united as a loose fe-
deration, the political system of which would
provide the Turks with a secure voting position.
The AKP initially supported AnnanÕs plan but the
generals, the opposition and the president rejec-
ted it. The stance of the Turkish army was a de-
cisive factor in the change of the AKPÕs attitude
and the negotiating position of Turkish Cypriots.
Their leader Rauf Denktash ultimately rejected
the UN plan after four months of negotiations,
even though amendments favourable to the
Turks had been introduced to it, and even tho-
ugh Turkish Cypriots had joined massive demon-
strations to support a compromise. In this way,
Denktash provided an alibi to the Greeks, who
were not particularly satisfied with AnnanÕs pro-
posal anyway. The situation remains relatively
unchanged to this day. The forces supporting
AnnanÕs plan garnered only a slightly greater
number of votes than the planÕs opponents in
the parliamentary elections held in December
2003 in the Turkish part of Cyprus. As a result,
the government was formed by two parties with
opposing views on this subject. Meanwhile, the
solution of the Cyprus issue gained increased
importance in the pro-European endeavours of
Turkey. The 2003 Regular Report, a document
evaluating TurkeyÕs progress, was the first to
put a greater emphasis on the fact that solving
the Cyprus problem was one of the key criteria
to be met by Ankara in order for the EU to open
negotiations with Turkey. Negotiations between
the Cypriot Turks and Greeks began in February
2004. The both sides agreed to hold a referen-
dum on Kofi AnnanÕs plan with amendments
made by the Secretary General in case a compro-
mise is not reached.
The main reason why Turkey was granted the
status of a candidate country during the Hel-
sinki summit was the strategically motivated
concern about the possible consequences of
Europe repulsing this country. It was a signifi-
cant decision because, now that Turkey was
a candidate, the EU could not refuse to open ac-
cession negotiations with Ankara without je-
opardising its international credibility, provi-
ded that TurkeyÕ improved the condition of its
economy and respected human rights. If the
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Union rejected TurkeyÕs application for the
third time, this would probably halt the inte-
gration process almost completely.
The Helsinki summit introduced a new quality
to the EUÐTu r key relations. The EU began to
support Tu r key in the adaptation process more
a c t i v e l y, especially after the 2002 Copenhagen
summit. Pr o-European reforms in Tu r key were
b u t t ressed by the internal changes that had ta-
ken place in the country since 1999. After the
v i c t o ry of Turkish troops and the capture of the
PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, human rights vio-
lations began to take place on a smaller scale
and the Turkish elite is now pre p a red to grant
the Ku rds some kind of cultural autonomy. The
evolution of Turkish Islamists and the emergen-
ce of the AKP have alleviated tension between
the secular and the Muslim elite. The AKPÕ s v i c-
t o ry in the 2002 parliamentary elections has
led to the formation of a stable government
whose priority is to align the Turkish legisla-
tion to European standards. The deep financial
crisis of 2000Ð2001 has forced Tu r key to imple-
ment the necessary reforms. If they are conti-
nued, Tu r key may be able to enter a stable path
of long-term development98. The pro- E u r o p e a n
reforms have also activated NGOs in Tu r ke y9 8.
Among the factors that might threaten Tu r-
ke yÕ s integration, the November bombings in
Istanbul, for which a claim of responsibility has
been made by the al-Qaeda and Turkish Islamic
ex t remists, may be the most serious9 9.
The implementation of reforms intended to
adapt Turkey to European standards is an evo-
lutionary process that stumbles on various ob-
stacles. In 1999Ð2002, the governmentÕs deter-
mination was restrained by the internal diffe-
rences within the coalition, and especially by
the presence of the nationalist MHP. When the
AKP came to power, it was the military and the
president that hindered the reforms to some
degree. In general, though, the armyÕs attitude
towards reforms is positive. Most generals, in-
cluding the chief of staff gen. Hilmi Ozkok, be-
lieve that TurkeyÕs accession to the EU is in ke-
eping with the line of Kemal Ataturk. They are
prepared to self-restrain their position, but
worry about the consequences of this step for
the countryÕs integrity (the Kurdish issue) and
the secularity of state. It is a Turkish paradox
that in order for in-depth reforms to be initia-
ted, a political force referring to Islam in some
way had to rise to power. The army distrusts
the AKP, fearing that its aim is to abolish the
secularity of state100. In late 2003, there was so-
me tension between the AKP and the army
over the role of religion in public life101.
If the EU is to open negotiations with Turkey, it
is of key importance that the reforms passed
by parliament be implemented practically on
the local level. The European Commission pu-
blished the fifth Turkey Regular Report in No-
vember 2003. It noted the first positive effects
of reforms passed to date102. However, in the
Report it is also claimed that Turkey must con-
tinue the legislative reforms, especially with
respect to civilian control over the army103, fur-
ther expansion of the freedom of speech, asso-
ciations104, assembly and religion105 and the in-
dependence of the court system106. Further, the
Report claimed that the reforms passed by par-
liament have not been implemented to a suffi-
cient degree107. Views of the European Union
are borne out by analyses of Turkish and inter-
national human rights organisations. They re-
port that the human rights situation improved
in the second half of 2003, e.g. there were fe-
wer instances of the use of torture, but it rema-
ins unsatisfactory108.
Since Brussels expressly declares that it will
only open negotiations with Turkey if the Cy-
prus issue is settled, chances are that it might
be solved before May 2004.
Tu r key will pass further pro-European legislati-
ve reforms in 20041 0 9. The human rights situ-
ation will improve, but not satisfactorily before
December 20041 1 0 Ð one has to wait longer to
see adequate results. There f o re, in December
2004 the European Union will have to decide
whether to re w a rd Tu r key for the progress ma-
de so far and open negotiations, helping Ankara
to fully implement the legislative reforms along
the way, or to postpone this decision for ano-
ther year or two.
From 1999 to 2004, Turkey adjusted its legisla-
tion to the Community acquis to a m o d e s t
extent111 but Brussels must not invoke this as
a reason to refuse to open negotiations with
Ankara. In all candidate countries, the align-
ment process gained momentum only after the
relative negotiation chapters were opened. 
Adam Balcer
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1 The population of Turkey currently accounts for 70 per-
cent of the population of the remaining twelve candidate
countries taken together.
2 The population of Turkey is smaller than that of Germany,
but it will be greater in the next 15 to 20 years due to a hi-
gher birth rate in Turkey. According to demographic foreca-
sts, Turkey will have apopulation of 80 million before 2020.
3 The European part of Turkey is only 5 percent of the coun-
tryÕsterritory. It is inhabited by more than 10 percent of the
population. 
4 According to the Eurobarometer 58 (autumn 2002), 49
percent of EU citizens were against the integration of Tur-
key, with 32 percent for. Other candidate countries with
more opponents than supporters of their accession inclu-
ded Romania (45 percent against, 35 percent for), Bulgaria
(40 percent against, 38 percent for) and Slovenia (40 per-
cent against and 39 percent for). The membership of Poland
was opposed by 34 percent and supported by 48 percent of
respondents. http://euro p a . e u . i n t / c o m m / p u b l i c _ o p i n i o n /
standard_en.htm
5 Western Anatolia had closer ties with Europe than the
other, non-European border regions. Presumably, the geo-
graphic argument would be invoked much less frequently
against TurkeyÕsEuropean aspirations if the Turks were not
Muslims. 
6 The Ottoman part of Europe became the core of the Empi-
re. The empireÕs capital Ð Istanbul / Constantinople was lo-
cated in the European part. The Balkans were the Empi-
reÕsrichest region. The Balkans were also where most of the
empireÕs elite came from. A large number of Turks descen-
ded from refugees and migrants from the Balkans, and Gre-
eks of Anatolia, who were converted to Islam. To a certain
degree, the Ottoman Empire was a continuation of the
Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium). Members of the Otto-
man dynasty used the title of Roman emperors or Romans
to refer to themselves. One of the EmpireÕs goals was to re-
build the Roman Empire, though this time as a Muslim bo-
dy. Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, London
2000, p. 29Ð31.
7 In the 17th century, the central authority of the Empire lost
some of its power, and the society gained more indepen-
dence and say. According to Bernard Lewis, the position of
the Ottoman EmpireÕs society at that time was similar to
the position of society in some of the Western absolutist
monarchies such as France. Bernard Lewis, Muzu¸maÄski
Bliski Wschd, Warsaw 2003, p. 118.
8 It should be remembered, though, that Òin the first half of
the 16 th century, the Ottoman system was at the height of
its glory and no wonder that contemporary European obse-
rvers viewed it as a model of efficient and centralised abso-
lutism. [...] they looked forward to a new European age of
enlightened royal despotism within a national state, and
saw Turkey as the paradigm of a disciplined modern mo-
narchy (this quote was taken from the Polish edition of Le-
wisÕ book and re-translated into English). Ibid., p. 118. 
9 Before the end of the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire
aimed to conquer as much European territory as possible,
and to introduce the Sharia there. The Turkish expansion
was resisted mainly by the Habsburg monarchy and Venice.
The wars they waged against the Ottomans were to some
extend religious conflicts, although in the course of these
wars the Ottoman Empire did co-operate with the Euro p e a n
and Christian rivals of its opponents, e.g. with France. 
10 According to a survey carried out towards the end of De-
cember 2003 by the liberal Milliyet daily, nearly 40 percent
of Turks view the EU as a ÒChristian clubÓ. Nearly 22 per-
cent of them have no idea when Turkey is going to join the
EU, and 18 percent do not believe that Turkey will ever be-
come an EU member. Such concerns were seldom spelt in
the other candidate countries. According to the 2002Ð2003
Candidate Countries Eurobarometers, 34Ð38 percent of
Turks said that they rather distrusted the Union. A similar
degree of distrust was recorded only in Estonia (32Ð37 per-
cent) and, on a smaller scale in Latvia and Malta, and the
countries of the Fifteen Ð 37 to 38 percent. http://europa.eu.
int/comm/public_opinion/cceb_en.htm 
11 According to the February 2003 Eurobarometer, the Turks
were the only candidate society to name loss of identity
and loss of language among the three greatest threats in
the development of aunited Europe (46 percent and 51 per-
cent, respectively). (Concern about the loss of identity was
also spelt by 48 percent of Cypriots). Generally, however,
the Turks reported a medium level of concern about the
consequences of the uniting of Europe, as compared with
the remaining candidate countries. http://euro p a . e u .
i n t / c o m m / p u b l i c _ o p i n i o n / a rc h i v e s / c c e b / 2 0 0 3 / 2 0 0 3 . 2 _ f u l l _
report_final.pdf 
12 From the 70s to the 90s, many inhabitants of these re-
gions moved to cities in the western part of the country.
13 In the most recent Eurobarometer public opinion poll
carried out in March 2003, 45 percent of Turks said they
identified with their own national identity exclusively, whi-
le 52 percent identified with a European identity to some
extent. The British, the Spanish and Greeks, and, among the
candidate communities, the Hungarians, showed higher
identification with their national identity exclusively. Ho-
wever, as many as 92 percent of the Hungarians and only
47 percent of the Turks said ÒyesÓ when asked whether
they were proud of their Europeanness, in the survey car-
ried out in spring 2002 (ÒnoÓ being the answer of 42 per-
cent of Turks). Only the British were less proud of their Eu-
ropeanness than the Turks. Probably, though, if the Turks
were asked this question in autumn 2003, the result would
have been better and might have exceeded 50 percent, as
there is a clear upward moving trend in the TurksÕ sense of
pride of being European; http://europa.eu.int/comm/pu-
blic_opinion/standard_en.htm
14 This tendency first manifested itself when Turkey was re-
cognised as a member of the Holy Alliance in the wake of
the Crimean War (1853Ð1856), during which great western
powers (France, Great Britain) fought hand in hand with
the Turks against the army of another Christian state (Rus-
sia) for the first time in history. This demonstrated that Tur-
key was treated differently from the other Muslim states.
15 Cyprus is of strategic importance as akind of natural air-
field in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its population is less
than 80 percent Greek and more than 20 percent Turkish.
From the 50s to the 70s, the Greeks strove to unite the is-
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land with Greece, while the Turks would come up with an
alternative proposition to divide the island. In 1974, Cyprus
became the scene of a military coup dÕetat which aimed to
unite the island with Greece. The Turkish army interv e n e d ,
and the territory it managed to conquer was transformed in
1983 into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC ) ,
recognised by Turkey only.
16 Advocates of TurkeyÕs membership emphasise that once
the country integrates with the European Union, its capa-
bility of pursuing active foreign policies in these regions
will expand greatly.
17 Turkey had ten government cabinets from 1971 to 1980. 
18 In 1978, 1.5 thousand people died in the fights between
radical right and radical left organisations.
19 The army is TurkeyÕs most respected institution. It is tru-
sted by 80 percent of the society. For comparison, only 32
percent of Turks trust religious leaders. 
20 It should be remembered that building amodern Turkish
nation was not an easy process. In the early 20s, the Mu-
slim population of Turkey was much more diversified eth-
nically than it is now. Large numbers of non-Turks from the
Balkans and the Caucasus, as well as the Anatolia Muslims,
have been assimilated into the Turkish culture.
21 The Kurdish issue is one of the most complex in Eurasia.
The Kurds are the worldÕs largest nation without a state of
its own (over 20 million). They live in four countries with
complex ethnic and religious structures (Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Turkey), and in each of them they account for a sub-
stantial part of the population. In many regions they live
intermingled with the neighbouring nations. The percenta-
ge of Kurds within TurkeyÕs population will rise due to the-
ir high natality.
22 For 30 years, the Kurds have migrated to cities in We-
stern Turkey on a massive scale. As a result, nearly half of
all Kurds live beyond so-called Kurdistan south-eastearn
Anatolia. Given the present migration trends, most Turkish
Kurds will soon live in Western Turkey.
23 On the government side, this included the pacification of
villages supporting the PKK, during which civilians were
killed, and the use of torture against PKK supporters. The
war on the Kurdish guerrillas has not transformed into an
open ethnic conflict, though. This was due to the deep in-
ternal divisions in the Kurdish community stemming from
the strength of clan structures (relatively high support for
the government side). Other factors included the pacifying
impact of a shared religion, the existence of numerous mi-
xed marriages, and a high degree of the Kurdish popula-
tionÕs integration with the Turkish society. All of these fac -
tors led to the acceptance of the countryÕs territorial inte-
grity, and so did the fact that For example, president Turgut
Ozal was of Kurdish origin. 
24 According to research carried out by Pew Research Cen-
ter in late 2003, 73 percent of Turks believe that religion
should be separated from the state. For comparison, 65 per-
cent of Poles, 33 percent of Pakistanis and 24 percent of Jor-
danians share this opinion. 63 percent of Turks believe that
the role of religion in school education should be limited.
Only 26 percent of Jordanians and 27 percent of Pakistanis
are of the same opinion. On the other hand, 65 percent of
Turks claim that religion plays an important role in their
private life. According to surveys by Turkish public opinion
research institutions, approx. 40 percent of Turks do not
fast during the Ramadan, while approx. 30 percent pray re-
gularly. The views on the position of women in society also
set the Turks apart from other Muslims. Nearly 70 percent
of Turks have no reservations concerning womenÕs equal
position in the family (going out to work, equal division of
duties). For comparison, this opinion is shared by only 14
percent of Jordanians and 33 percent of Pakistanis. http://
people-press.org
25 The main point of contention was the issue of headsca-
rves worn by female students and officials, and the status
of religious school students. 91 percent of Turks believe
that wearing or not wearing the scarf should be the priva-
te decision of the woman. 52 percent of Pakistanis and 60
percent Jordanians are of the same opinion. According to
last yearÕs research, more than 60 percent of Turks believe
that female state officials should have the right to wear the
scarf. 75 percent of Turks believe that school and universi-
ty students should also have this right. Pew Research Cen-
tre website, http://people-press.org, Turkish Daily News
website, http://www. t u r k i s h d a i l y n e w s . c o m / o l d _ e d i t i o n s /
2003.htm
26 Unlike in the Arab countries, the functional democratic
system in Turkey served as a Òsafety valveÓ to canalise the
frustration of Islamic communities. 
27 According to Gilles Kepel, an Islam researcher, the funda-
mentalist communities consist of two groups: the pious,
conservative small bourgeois, and the radical metropolitan
poor. The tensions between these two have limited the po-
tential of Refah. Gilles Kepel, åwi«ta wojna. Ekspansja
i upadek fundamentalizmu islamskiego, Warsaw 2003. 
28 In 1995, Refah garnered more than 20 percent of votes. It
was supported not only by fundamentalists. As a party op-
posing the establishment, Refah won over the votes of the
poor and frustrated. 
29 The European Union spelt concern, but no serious criti-
cism, about the armyÕs intervention and the dissolution of
Refah in 1998 and Fazilet in 2001. In 2001, the Strasbourg
Tribunal ruled that the dissolution had been legal by a t i g h t
majority of votes. 
30 In 1998, Refah made aperfunctory declaration of support
for TurkeyÕs integration with the EU.
3 1 After the coup dÕetat, the military junta approved of the
idea of a ÒTurkish-Islamic synthesisÓ which recognised Sun-
ni Islam as a important element of the Turkish national
i d e n t i t y, in order to weaken the influence of the extreme left
and the Ku rdish nationalists, and re i n f o rce the stateÕs u n i t y.
Since the authorities began to support Sunni Islam, the Ale-
vites developed a m o re acute sense of self-awareness, which
led to demands for autonomy on their part, and damaged
their relations with the Sunnis (riots, pogro m s ) .
32 In 2002, 33 percent of the population of Turkey earned
their living in the agricultural sector, the percentage for Ro-
mania being nearly 38 percent. Approx. 15 percent of adult
Turks are illiterate. Among the EU Member States and can-
didate countries, Portugal has the highest level of illiteracy,
with 7.5 percent of the population not being able to read or
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write. Even though the life expectancy in Turkey is 70.1
years (70.5 in Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania), as many as
42 children in each 1000 born in Turkey die before the age
of 5. For comparison, in Romania it is 21 in each 1000. The
main reason for this situation is the fact that Turkey has the
lowest number of physicians per 100 thousand inhabitants
among all candidate countries, being just 129. Romania is
in the last-but-one position with 191 physicians per 100
thousand people. Among the candidate countries, Turkey is
also in the last position in terms of the societyÕseducation.
TurkeyÕs education index for 2001, determined by the UN
based on the percentage of people with high school and
university education was 0.77; for comparison, it was 0.88
in Romania. Turkey shows better results than Romania,
though worse than the remaining candidates, in terms of
computerisation, telephony and sanitary standards. 4 per-
cent of Turks and 3.2 percent of Romanians own PCs. Tur-
key has 285 telephone links per 1000 inhabitants, the num-
ber being 185 in Romania. 10 percent of Turks have no ac-
cess to basic sanitation, and 18 percent to clean water. The
numbers for Romania are 47 percent and 42 percent, re-
spectively. Another serious problem in Turkey is widespre-
ad corruption. In the most recent corruption ranking by
Transparency International, Turkey is in the last-but-one
position among the candidate countries, before Romania.
A specifically Turkish issue, not found in any other candida-
te country on such a scale, is the unequal position of wo-
men in society. The number of girls in high schools in 2000
was only 70 percent of the number of boys. 4 percent of
MPs were female. Human Development Report website,
h t t p : / / w w w. u n d p . o rg/hdr2003/, Tr a n s p a rency Internatio-
nal website, http://www.transparency.org/
33 In 2002, TurkeyÕs GDP measured as the per capita purcha-
sing power parity accounted for just 23 percent of the EU
GDP, the figures for Romania and Bulgaria being 25 percent.
Before the 2000Ð2001 crisis, Turkey was ahead of both 
countries. Economic forecasts suggest Turkey may catch up
with Romania within the next years. 
34 According to the Human Development Report, Turkey
shows the greatest social disparities among all candidates
and Member States of the EU. The Gini index, which measu-
res disparities in the distribution of consumption and inco-
me, is 40.0 in Turkey (0 Ð full equality, 100 Ð full inequality).
Portugal and Germany showed similar results with 38.5
and 38.2, respectively. For comparison, the result for the
United States was slightly higher than for Turkey (40.8)
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/
35 For example, Turkey reported economic growth at 7.5
percent of the GDP in 1997, only to show a decline of 4.7
percent of the GDP two years later. In 1997, inflation re-
ached 85 percent. It should be remembered though, that in
the last 30 years, the Turkish economy has shown smaller
fluctuations than, for instance, the Portuguese economy
before accession to the EU. It should also be remembered
that some of the economic problems stemmed from occur-
rences beyond the Turkish governmentÕs control, such as
the Gulf War (1991) and the great earthquake (1999).
36 In 2001, foreign investments accounted for 2.3 percent of
the GDP, while in 2002 Ð only 0.6 percent. All foreign inve-
stments accumulated, their per capita amount in 2000 was
296 Euro. In terms of the GDP percentage, this was the lo-
west result among all candidate countries. In terms of the
amount of per capita foreign investments, Turkey reported
better than Romania and Bulgaria in 2000. 
3 7 In 2002, it accounted for 10 percent of the GDP and was
the highest among all candidate countries. However, the de-
ficit of Hungary, in second place, was only 0.8 percent lower. 
38 The IMF granted Turkey the second largest loan (after
Brazil), amounting to of 30 billion US$. The main reason
why the IMF is so committed to the reconstruction of the
Turkish economy is the position of the US which considers
Turkey to be astrategic ally. As part of the IMF programme,
deep cuts in public spending were carried out, the banking
system was privatised, some of the state-owned monopo-
lies were liquidated, and the system of supporting the agri-
cultural sector was modified to meet European standards. 
39 According to research commissioned by Milliyet towards
the end of December 2003, 74 percent were for integration,
with 17 percent against. 
40 According to the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer of
2003.02, 61 percent of Turks believed that membership wo-
uld bring more profits than losses. For comparison, this opi-
nion was shared by 40 percent of Poles and 26 percent of
Latvians.
41 Characteristically, integration gets more support in the
poor Kurdish regions, the most traditionalist part of the co-
untry. Ali Carkoglu, Who Wants Full Membership? (in:) Tur-
key and the European Union, (ed.) Ali Carkoglu, Barry Ru-
bin, London 2003, p. 175Ð178.
42 In the 2003.02 Eurobarometer the Turks were the only
ones to name liquidation of the national currency among
the three greatest concerns connected with enlargement
(48 percent). Adecisive majority of Turks support the EU fo-
reign and defence policy, though at the same time they
want the national states to keep their decision competen-
cies in these areas to the highest degree among all candida-
te societies. In this respect, they are like the British. 
43 The accession of poor Central European countries raises
fears concerning aÒdouble-speed UnionÓ and the stalling of
the internal integration process within the EU. According
to those EU politicians who fear this scenario, the accession
of the poor Turkey with a population of 80 million will ma-
ke its materialisation more likely.
44 In the 50s and the 60s, the poor from rural areas in Tur-
key migrated on a massive scale to the EEC, especially to
Germany. As a result, more than 3.5 million Turks and Tur-
kish Kurds live presently in the EU. Their social and cultu-
ral integration is one of the major internal problems facing
Germany. In the 90s, the fear of another wave of migration
became one of the major arguments of German opponents
of TurkeyÕs accession. It should be remembered, though,
that the problem of Turks in Germany is much less severe
than the issue of Arab migrants from the Maghreb in Fran-
ce. It is certain that if the EU opens negotiations with Tur-
key, one of the conditions imposed by the Community will
be to introduce a long transition period during which Tur-
kish citizens will not be allowed to work in certain coun-
tries of the EU.
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4 5 It is rather likely that opening negotiations with Tu r key will
entail modifications to the terms of EU funding distribution. 
46 This border is 2.2 thousand kilometres long and would be
the longest external border of a single EU Member State. It
runs through mountain regions that are difficult to control
and is crossed by major routes for the smuggling of drugs
and illegal migrants from Asia. One of the ways to solve
this problem could be to keep border checks at Tur-
keyÕs land and maritime borders with Bulgaria and Greece
for some time.
47 One of the reasons why Turkey requested the conclusion
of an association agreement was the fact that Greece, An-
karaÕs traditional rival, had taken the same decision.
48 Article 28 provided that if adequate conditions for Turkey
joining the Community arise, the Contracting Parties shall
examine the possibility of TurkeyÕs accession.
49 In the first period, the EEC was supposed to grant Turkey
a loan of 175 million ECU and increase the export quotas of
TurkeyÕs four basic agricultural export commodities. Turkey
was only required to provide optimum conditions for the
development of its own economy. The customs union was
projected to be established in the second transition period.
The EEC agreed to gradually lift custom duties on all Tur-
kish commodities in this period and to allow free move-
ment of labour. Turkey agreed to reduce custom duties on
European commodities, though at a slower rate, and to in -
troduce the Common External Tariff (CET). The Community
was to lift its custom duties and quotas on Turkish commo-
dities as of 1 December 1975, while Turkey was supposed
to do the same for Community commodities as of 1 Decem-
ber 1986. The CET was to be introduced on the same date.
In the closing stage, the EEC and Turkey were to co-ordina-
te their economic policies and harmonise their fiscal and
competition legislation. Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU,
Hants 2003, p. 57Ð59.
5 0 The EEC countries agreed to completely lift customs and
quotas on all Turkish manufactured goods except for cotton
p roducts and carpets, on which the customs duties and con-
tingents were to be liberalised gradually over 12 years of the
effective date (1973). The EEC also agreed to apply a 0 per-
cent tariff to 37 percent of Turkish agricultural products and
a p re f e rential tariff to a further 33 percent of such pro d u c t s .
F i n a l l y, Tu r key was also supposed to be included in the pro-
visions on free movement of labour and equal rights for Tu r-
kish workers in the EU. Gradually, all restrictions on the mo-
vement of labour were to be abolished. The EEC pledged to
p rovide financial aid. Tu r ke y, on the other hand, agreed to lift
custom duties on 55 percent of commodities imported fro m
the EU within 12 years, and customs duties on all commodi-
ties within the next 10 years (1995), and to lift the quotas.
I b i d ., p. 60Ð61.
51 The EEC lifted customs tariffs on Turkish manufactured
goods and introduced preferential tariffs on agricultural
products. It also provided the agreed financial credit in the
amount of 577 million ECU. Turkey, on its part, lifted the ta-
riffs on 20 percent of the EEC commodities and reduced the
quotas on 40 percent of EEC commodities. 
52 In the mid 70s, the EEC concluded free trade agreements
with all Mediterranean countries except for Albania and Li-
bya as part of its Mediterranean policy. As a result, Tur -
keyÕs association agreement with the EEC was no longer
exceptional. Products of other Mediterranean countries
competing with those of Turkey gained access to the Euro-
pean market, frequently on terms better than those gran-
ted to Ankara. The countries with which the EEC concluded
the free trade agreements did not have to make any of the
commitments that Turkey did. Ibid., p. 62.
53 The average GDP in the EEC was much higher at that ti-
me than the expected 2004 average GDP. At the time of
conclusion of the Association Agreement, the average per
capita GDP in the EEC was 2800 US$, while in Turkey it was
only 180 US$. At that time, nearly 80 percent of the Turkish
labour force worked in the agricultural sector.
5 4 Detention duration was reduced from 15 days to 24 hours
in areas not in state of emerg e n c y, and the accused were gran-
ted extended rights to contact lawyers. I b i d ., p. 118Ð120.
55 The structure of Turkish exports became diversified. In
the 70s, raw materials and agricultural products dominated
exports. 20 years later, textiles became TurkeyÕs most im-
portant export commodity. The share of cars in exports al-
so increased. 
56 The Matutes Package proposed the conclusion of a cu-
stoms union by 1995, increased financial and technical co-
operation, promotion of industrial and technological co-
operation, and closer political and cultural ties. The packa-
ge set more modest goals for Turkey and the EEC than the
Association Agreement because it did not propose any ac-
tion for the development of a common agricultural policy,
services and freedom of movement.
57 Articles 141 and 142 were deleted, under which it was il-
legal to form associations or engage in propaganda calling
for the establishment of a dictatorial, racist or communist
regime. Also deleted was article 163, which prohibited the
formation of associations or engaging in propaganda cal-
ling for a change of the system of government along reli-
gious principles. 
58 In 1991, the ANAP even promised to recognise Kurdish as
an official language in areas inhabited by the Kurdish ma-
jority. However, it lost the elections.
59 Turkey cut its tariffs substantially already in 1994, tho-
ugh they were kept in place for the crucial sectors (export
of cars and pharmaceuticals).
60 Under the amendments passed, the ban was lifted that
denied associations and trade unions the right to engage in
political activities. Political parties were granted the right
to establish youth and womenÕs organisations, to open of-
fices abroad and to establish contacts with international
organisations. MPs became entitled to change political par-
ties and to appeal to the constitutional court in case they
were about to lose their immunity. Voting age was reduced
from 21 to 18, and the prohibition for students and lectu-
rers to join political parties was lifted. Parliament passed
amendments to article 8 of the anti-terrorist law, under
which only deliberate actions and statements calling for
violation of the stateÕs integrity were subject to penalty. As
regards the Kurdish MPs, two of them were released, but fo-
ur were sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for separatist
activities. Ibid., p. 129Ð131.
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61 Not all technical barriers were removed, and the trade
policy was not harmonised: the parties failed to sign agre-
ements on free trade with non-members of the EU, to intro-
duce a preferential EU customs system and to eliminate the
monopolies.
62 Before 2000, the EU failed to pay Turkey the 375 million
Euro to which the latter was entitled under the customs
union. The reason was TurkeyÕs failure to respect human 
rights. For the same reason, subsidies earmarked for Turkey
in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme were
withheld. Finally, because of the veto by Greece, Turkey co-
uld not make use of the inexpensive loans of the European
Investment Bank. 
6 3 The duration of detention by the Security Courts was re-
duced from 14 days to 4 days in regions not in state of emer-
g e n c y, and from 30 to 10 days in regions in state of emerg e n-
c y. Detainees in regions in state of emergency were also al-
lowed access to lawyers. Regular Report from the Commis-
sion on Tu r ke yÕ s Pro g ress towards Accession, p. 15Ð17.
h t t p : / / e u ro p a . e u . i n t / c o m m / e n l a rg e m e n t / re p o r t _ 1 1 _ 9 8 /
pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf
6 4 In 1999, before the summit, the Turkish parliament amen-
ded the law on State Security Courts by removing military
judges from such courts. It also amended the law on politi-
cal parties by limiting the possibility of arbitrary dissolution,
and the criminal code, by introducing more precise definition
of torture and abuse of power. In December 1999, the go-
vernment issued regulations allowing religious foundations
to refurbish religious facilities without special permits fro m
the authorities. Shortly after the summit, the criminal code
was amended so as to facilitate, to a limited extent, the pro-
secution of police officers accused of using torture. 2000 Re-
gular Report from the Commission on Tu r ke yÕ s Pro g ress 
t o w a rds Accession p. 13Ð19, http://euro p a . e u . i n t / c o m m /
e n l a rg e m e n t / report_11_00/pdf/en/tu_en.pdf 
65 The main reason why the relations between Greece and
Turkey improved was the fact that Greece had to reduce its
defence spending in connection with the new EU standards
imposed on the Greek economy.
66 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCRP), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the UN Convention on the Rights
of Women and the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 
67 It was a compromise between the reformers and the
MHP nationalists in the government. The most disputed is-
sues included the cultural autonomy for the Kurds, aboli-
tion of the death penalty, liberalisation of the anti-separa-
tist and anti-terrorist laws, and settlement of the Cyprus
problem. 
68 In 2000Ð2003, Turkey received 531 million Euro from 
the EU.
69 Parliament amended the constitution preamble and artic-
les 13 and 14, deleting the provisions on penalties for tho-
ughts and opinions undermining the stateÕs integrity. We-
bsite of the Directorate General of Press and Information,
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ 
7 0 The amendment included detailed provisions under which
dissolution of a party was allowed only if its anti-state acti-
vities were intensive and resolved, and were undertaken by
the party leader, its parliamentary club or party authorities.
I b i d .
71 The composition of the National Security Council was
expanded to include the minister of justice; as a result the
number of civilian members on the council became equal to
that of military members. In another amendment, the pro-
vision suggesting that the CouncilÕs opinions presented to
the government were binding was removed. Ibid.
72 For example, the provision under which man was the he-
ad of family was deleted, and women were granted the ri-
ght to keep their maiden name in marriage. Ibid.
73 By amending article 312 (inciting ethnic, class, religious
or language-motivated hatred), and article 159 of the crimi-
nal code, and articles 7 and 8 of the anti-terrorist law. As re-
gards article 312, a provision was introduced to the effect
that inciting is subject to penalty if it poses a threat to pu-
blic order. Ibid.
7 4 Detention duration was reduced from 7 to 4 days. Seven-
day detention was retained in regions under state of emer-
g e n c y, i.e. in south-eastern Tu r ke y. Even though the changes
w e re generally positive, the radical increase of the rates of
fines for anti-state activities was a step backwards. I b i d .
75 The amendments lifted restrictions impeding the forma -
tion of associations, allowed creation of association federa-
tions and participation of meetings abroad. They also au-
thorised associations to invite nationals of foreign coun-
tries, but subject to permission of the local authorities. Ibid.
76 The provision was deleted under which it was prohibited
to replace imprisonment penalties with fines in the case of
publishers and editors. Ibid.
77 Under this amendment, the period in which the accused
must not contact his or her lawyer was reduced from 4 to
2 days of detention. Ibid.
78 The authorities lost the right to prohibit demonstrations,
but retained the right to postpone them for a long period
of 3 months. Ibid.
79 A provision was introduced to the Freedom of Associa-
tion article of the constitution to the effect that freedom of
association may only be restricted if the given associa-
tionÕsactivities threaten national security, public order, pre-
vention of crime, Òpublic moralsÓ and the protection of
other citizensÕ rights. Also under this amendment, Turkish
associations may contact foreign associations and foreign
associations may establish branches in Turkey solely sub-
ject to permission from the authorities. Ibid.
80 An amendment was passed to Article 159, under which
criticism of the government, parliament or the armed for-
ces was fully authorised unless it was intended as slander.
Ibid.
81 In the period in question, they received more than 3.2 bil-
lion Euro.
8 2 Foundations, but only those established by religious com-
m u n i t i e s recognised by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, i.e. the
Jewish, the Orthodox and the Armenian, were granted the
right to acquire real estate subject to the authoritiesÕ per-
mission. They were not entitled, however, to reclaim real
estate seized by the state or to let the real estate in their
possession. Ibid.
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83 Prosecutors were authorised to initiate investigations
concerning torture without the permission of higher in-
stances, and persons sentenced for the use of torture lost
the right to have their sentences stayed or to pay fines in-
stead of serving prison sentences. Ibid.
84 Courses could be organised, subject to the govern-
mentÕs consent, exclusively at new private schools establi-
shed especially for this purpose, only on weekends, for stu-
dents aged 12Ð18. No language other than Turkish could be
the language of instruction. The organisation of such cour-
ses was under the Ministry of EducationÕs control. Ibid.
85 Article 8 of the anti-terrorist law was rescinded, and ar-
ticle 1 of the said law introduced a more narrow definition
of terrorism. Ibid.
8 6 A re p resentative of the National Security Council was re-
moved from the composition of the Superv i s o ry Council. The
amendment also limited the CouncilÕs competencies. I b i d .
87 The ban for the accused to contact their lawyers within
48 hours of detention was lifted. Consequently, the possibi-
lity of subjecting detainees to torture was restricted. Ibid.
88 Parents were allowed to give their children Kurdish na-
mes, though in Turkish transcription. Ibid.
89 The amendments to the constitutional articles defining
its competencies limited the powers of its secretary gene-
ral to an advisory function exclusively. The right to nomina-
te the secretary general was taken away from the chief of
general staff and given to the prime minister (nomination
of candidate) and the president (approval of candidate).
Consequently, civilians may be appointed to this position.
Parliament was also authorised to control the military bud-
get, though debates on this subject have to be secret. The
National Security Council also lost the right to express opi-
nions on regulations governing the teaching of languages
other than Turkish. Ibid.
90 A provision was introduced under which courses could
be opened by existing education institutions. Ibid.
9 1 The ban on former political prisoners establishing asso-
ciations was lifted. Students were allowed to establish asso-
ciations dealing not only with student affairs, but also with
s c h o l a r l y, artistic and cultural issues. The right to establish
associations was expanded to include corporate bodies. I b i d .
92 The amendment obligated the prosecution authorities to
handle torture cases as a priority, in a special accelerated
mode. Ibid.
93 The provision under which all activities facilitating the
operation of terrorist organisations were criminal was re-
scinded. Ibid.
9 4 As a result of the reform, military courts lost jurisdiction
over civilians accused of encouraging desertion, disobedien-
c e or evasion of military service by soldiers. Ibid.
95 Under this amendment, the time by which local authori -
ties could postpone a demonstration was reduced to one
month, and the reasons justifying such a decision were de-
fined more precisely. A provision was introduced under
which a demonstration could be postponed only if there
was a Òclear and imminent threat of criminal acts being
committedÓ. Ibid.
96 The provisions were rescinded under which it was possi-
ble to ban the distribution of artistic and scholarly works
under the pretext of infringement of moral principles, and
to destroy confiscated works allegedly infringing personal
interests or exploiting sexual desires. Ibid.
97 According to the EU forecasts, in 2003Ð2005 Turkey will
report economic growth at the rate of 5 percent, and its in-
flation will decrease systematically to less than 10 percent.
With lower interest rates on credits, investments will incre-
ase substantially and public finance will stabilise. These
optimistic forecasts promise to lessen the gap between Tur-
key and Europe and to facilitate its integration with the Eu-
ropean Union.
98 The major organisations supporting reforms include 
the Turkish IndustrialistsÕ and BusinessmenÕs Association
(TUSIAD), the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Founda-
tion (TESEV) and the Economic Development Foundation
(IKV). The latter launched an unprecedented pro-European
initiative in 2002 known as the ÒMovement for EuropeÓ,
which was joined by more than 200 non-governmental or-
ganisations. Ziya Onis, TurkeyÐEU Relations in the Post-Hel-
sinki Era, (in:), Turkey and the European Union, (ed.) Ali Car-
koglu, Barry Rubin, London 2003, p. 19Ð20.
99 These were the bloodiest terrorist attacks perpetrated by
the Turkish Islamic extremists, hitherto considered to be
a marginal group. Islamic extremists named the European
aspirations of Turkey among the reasons for their attack.
Shortly after the attacks, the German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder and the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said
the terrorist attacks would accelerate, rather than retard,
the process of TurkeyÕs integration with the EU. The Chri-
stian democratic parties in the European Parliament, howe-
ver, found the attacks to be another argument against Tur-
keyÕs accession. 
100 Some of the high-rank officers are generally opposed to
any reforms restraining the armyÕs position, irrespective of
who initiates them. Most officers will always have reserva-
tions concerning the AKP, firstly, because they have a very
rigorous idea of the stateÕs secularity, and secondly, becau-
se fundamentalist groups are present in the AKP ranks.
101 The AKP developed a draft for the reform of the Council
of Higher Education, an organisation established in the
80s following the coup dÕetat and exercising extensive con-
trol over Turkish universities. The draft projected that uni-
versities should be granted a broader autonomy, also on is-
sues such as studentsÕ apparel (in the 80s, Turgut Ozal
unsuccessfully tried to implement an identical solution).
Further, it projected that the government should have mo-
re influence in the Council and that students of secular and
religious high schools should have equal rights during all
university entry exams. The government withdrew the
draft, accused by the left-wing opposition, some university
teachers and the generals of attempting to Islamise higher
education. Though never implemented, the idea, to libera-
lise requirements for the organisation of Koranic courses al-
so became a source of tension, albeit less severe.
102 According to the Report, courts began to implement the
reforms. A majority of pending political trials initiated un-
der the articles that were amended were discontinued, and
courts decided to repeat the trials of persons already sen-
tenced under the articles in question. 2003 Regular Report
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from the Commission on TurkeyÕs Progress towards Acces-
sion, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/
pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf
103 Military representatives retained their positions in the
Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) and the Coun-
cil of Higher Education (YOK). As regards the armyÕs finan-
ce, the government failed to gain full de facto control over
it because there are two separate military funds apart from
the budget. Ibid.
104 It is still forbidden to establish religious and ethnic as-
sociations in Turkey. Ibid.
105 The most important reservation of the EU concerns the
unequal status of the Alevites. Ibid.
106 The key task is to finish the State Security Courts reform.
Ibid.
107 Implementation of the reforms has been carried out on-
ly on avery small degree as regards the Kurdish cultural au-
tonomy. The commission was seriously concerned about
Turkey failing to respect the verdicts issued by the Strasbo-
urg Court in suits lost by Ankara to Turkish citizens. Ibid.
108 Human Rights Association of Turkey; www.ihd.org.tr
109 In early April 2004, another reform package will be pas-
sed that will recognise the supremacy of international tre-
aties over the consitution, dissolve the State Security Co-
urts, remove the army representative from the Higher Edu-
cation Board, restrict the MPs immunity and introduce mo-
re severe penalties for torture and the so called honour kil -
lings of women accused of disgracing their families.
110 The reform process could be undermined by adeteriora-
tion of the security situation due to Islamic terrorism and
Kurdish guerrilla, both phenomena being linked to the situ-
ation in Iraq to some extent.
1 1 1 The part of the 2003 Report devoted to the alignment of
Turkish legislation with the a c q u i s summarises the pro g re s s
made by Tu r key in this area since the presentation of the Ac-
cession Partnership in 2000. The Report states: ÒTu r ke yÕ s
alignment has progressed in most areas, however remains
at an early stage in many chaptersÓ. According to the Com-
mission, Turkey has made most relative progress in terms
of the free movement of persons, services and goods, and
especially the free movement of capital, as well as agricul-
ture, statistics, industrial policy, regional policy, cultural po-
licy and telecommunications policy, and in particular, the
energy sector and internal affairs (border services). Ibid.
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